A market in human flesh: Ramsey's arguments on organ sale, 50 years later

In this paper, I revisit the arguments from Paul Ramsey's famous bioethical work, Patient as Person: Explorations in Medical Ethics. As we approach the fiftieth anniversary of Patient as Person, it is worth returning to Ramsey's arguments against the sale of human organs. In particular, my aim is to put Ramsey's work in conversation with more recent work in favor of the sale of organs to see if it holds up after a significant amount of time has passed and after the field of bioethics has changed. I take up concepts of consent and repugnance, as well as dignity, and argue that Ramsey's considerations are still relevant today. I am especially interested in specific critiques of his view from a philosopher in favor of the sale of organs, Mark Cherry. I argue that Cherry's primary critique of Ramsey, that the notion of repugnance is not sufficient to counter the liberty interests of others, especially in light of the grave need for organs, is successful, but that we should turn to arguments from Ramsey for a better understanding of the morally problematic nature of organ sales.